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INTRODUCTION
As one scholar wisely noted, "at the very minimum, the
availability of agency-initiated judicial review seems implicit to a
constitutional scheme of AJ finality."' Louisiana is the only state
in the nation with an Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter
APA) specifically precluding agency-initiated judicial review of
AUl final orders. In Wooley v. State Farm,2 the Louisiana
Supreme Court faced the issue of whether this administrative
scheme comports with the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. Depending on the court's ultimate conclusion, the
Louisiana Legislature could be praised for its ingenuity or
chastised for substituting efficiency for inherent principles. This
decision will be analyzed and followed closely by administrative
and constitutional scholars, lawyers, and legislators around the
country because Louisiana's unique APA places it on the brink of
the modem administrative state.
The Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately held that both
amendments to Louisiana's APA are constitutional.3  The court
correctly held that the mere creation of a central panel of ALJs is
constitutional. However, this comment contends that a proper
analysis in Wooley should have found that the denial of agency-
initiated judicial review in such a central panel system is
Copyright 2006, by LOUISIANA LAW REvmw.
1. Jim Rossi, Final, But Often Fallible: Recognizing Problems with ALJ
Finality, 56 Admin. L. Rev. 53, 66 (2004).
2. This matter was directly appealed from the district court to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, so there is no appellate court citation. See Wooley v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 502-311 (19th Jud. Dist. Ct. Nov. 13, 2003)
(oral reasons for judgment), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/la/briefs/state
_farm_dc.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2006).
3. Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 04-0882 (La. 2005), 893 So.
2d 746, 772.
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unconstitutional because it impermissibly infringes on both the
judicial and executive branches.
Agencies must be afforded some mechanism to perform their
delegated duty to make and enforce law and policy, while
respecting the fairness concerns of regulated entities and
individuals. This comment illustrates the detrimental effect of
focusing too much power in ALJs with no opportunity for judicial
review when ALJs rule against the agencies involved. This
comment also offers a critique on the court's rationales and
ultimate decision, while simultaneously analyzing issues that were
either missed, ignored, or not brought to the attention of the
Wooley court. In an attempt to correct the damage wreaked by this
decision, this comment explores two other states' APAs and their
solutions to the issues presented. A constitutional scheme would
respect both sides of this debate by allowing AL finality while
providing agency-initiated judicial review which incorporates
differing standards of review for issues of fact, issues of law, and
issues of policy.
Section I provides the necessary background information on
the administrative law aspects of this debate, while Section II
examines Louisiana's current APA prior to discussing the Wooley
matter in all its phases. Section III analyzes the constitutionality of
Louisiana's denial of agency-initiated judicial review in a system
of AU finality. Section IV engages in a comparative analysis
between Louisiana and the Carolinas to fully comprehend the
gravity of the constitutional concerns at stake. Finally, Section V
offers two proposals for a constitutionally sound APA. Both
proposals are equally capable of achieving the worthy goals
attempted by the Louisiana Legislature.
I. THE ORIGINS AND TRENDS OF MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. The Origins and Development of the Traditional Administrative
Procedure Act
Congress and state legislatures alike delegate to administrative
agencies the authority to promulgate, enforce, and interpret
regulations for recently passed statutes. One of the primary
vehicles for exercising this delegated duty includes administrative
adjudications, where agencies often make and enforce law and
policy. Since their inception, administrative agencies have been an
anomaly because of the vast number of roles they integrate into a
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single entity. These roles include that of investigator, prosecutor,
regulator, and adjudicator.4
Most states modeled their APAs on the federal APA.5 Prior to
the enactment of the federal APA, the political debate focused on
the degree of division between the agency's traditional regulatory
and adjudicatory functions.6 As a result, many people advocated
reform of the traditional agency system.7 This reform is usually
centered on separation of the adjudicatory function from other
agency functions so the system will be fairer.
Unlike many recent state APA amendments, the federal APA
does not remove administrative adjudications from the agency
itself, despite many unsuccessful attempts at reform. Instead,
federal hearing officers are placed outside of the control of agency
officials engaged in prosecuting or investigating claims. The
responsibility of the federal hearing officers is to make an initial
decision, which later becomes part of the record. It is this record
that is submitted for final review by the agency head or
commission.9 With this structure, the agency is left with the
discretion to follow the hearing officers' recommendation or to
make different findings of fact, conclusions of law, and thus may
reach a different determination than the hearing officer.' ° As a
result, under the federal APA, the ultimate decision remains with
the agency.
In 1961, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws enacted the Model State Administrative
Procedure Act." The 1961 Model State APA did not address the
primary concern of its federal counterpart: the seemingly coercive
and inefficient relationship between agencies and hearing officers.
4. Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, ALI Independence, and Administrative
Courts: The Recent Changes in Louisiana's Administrative Procedure Act, 59
La. L. Rev. 431, 441-44 (1999).
5. Id. at 434.
6. James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State Administrative Law
Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ Authority and Standards
ofAgency Review, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 1355, 1362-63 (2002).
7. See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals:
The Role of an Alternative Agency Structure, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 965 (1991)
and F. Scott McCown & Monica Leo, When Can an Agency Change the
Findings or Conclusions of an ALl? Part Two, 51 Baylor L. Rev. 63 (1999).
8. Flanagan, supra note 6, at 1363.
9. Id. at 1364. See also Gifford, supra note 7, at 970.
10. See Flanagan, supra note 6, at 1364.
11. See Bybee, supra note 4, at 444.
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However, in 1981, a revised APA was issued.12 This 1981 Model
State APA adopted the prior federal APA standard of allowing the
hearing officer or administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision to
constitute an initial conclusion for the agency head to consider
during his or her review of the matter. 13
B. Three Different Models of Administrative Adjudication
Despite differing terminology used by scholars, there are three
generalized models of administrative adjudication in the several
states.14 First, the agency staff approach, which is also known as
the internal model, renders the AiJs the least amount of decisional
independence. 15 This is because the ALJs operate entirely within
the agency. The ALT decision is merely a suggestion subject to
acceptance or rejection by the agency head or commission. 16
Second, the central panel approach provides for full separation
between agencies and AUs. Traditional agency adjudications are
not conducted by the agency involved in the matter; instead, the
adjudications are managed and controlled completely outside of
the agency involved.' 7 Central panel systems vary from state to
state. As a generalized notion, a central panel is a non-political,
merit-protected agency that is independent of the various state
agencies.18 This independence allows the central panel to perform
agency adjudications so that the ALJs will not feel compelled to
render favorable decisions to the agencies involved.
Finally, the "administrative court" model, also known as the
external model, is the most controversial approach. ALs have the
12. See Flanagan, supra note 6, at 1364.
13. Id. at 1363-64.
14. William B. Swent, South Carolina's AL: Central Panel, Administrative
Court, or a Little of Both?, 48 S.C. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1996) (citing Malcolm C. Rich
& Wayne E. Brucar, The Central Panel System for Administrative Law Judges:
A Survey of Seven States 10-11 (1983)). See also Rossi, supra note 1, at 56-58
(citing William R. Andersen, Judicial Review of State Administrative
Action--Designing the Statutory Framework, 44 Admin. L. Rev. 523, 555
(1992)).
15. Swent, supra note 14, at 2 (citing Malcolm C. Rich & Wayne E. Brucar,
The Central Panel System for Administrative Law Judges: A Survey of Seven
States 10 (1983)). See also Rossi, supra note 1, at 56.
16. See Rossi, supra note 1, at 56-57.
17. Id. at 57. See also Swent, supra note 14, at 2 (citing Malcolm C. Rich
& Wayne E. Brucar, The Central Panel System for Administrative Law Judges:
A Survey of Seven States 11 (1983)).
18. See Rossi, supra note 1, at 57.
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greatest amount of autonomy under this approach because they
have the authority to issue final, and immediately appealable,
decisions. 19 Review of such decisions is not open to the traditional
agencies. Instead, these decisions go directly to a reviewing court
in case of conflict.20 An APA system that grants such ALJ
authority is a system of "AU finality" or "ALJ final order
authority." In comparing these three models, Professor Rossi
noted that in contrast to the first two models, "the agency
effectively submits to binding arbitration before the AL" with this
external approach. 2 1 There are only four states which utilize thismodel: Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina, and Missouri. 22
C. The Trend Toward Central Panels
The concept of central panels in administrative agencies is not
as new and revolutionary as one might think. In 1945, California
was the first state to adopt a central panel for its administrative
agencies. 23  Nearly forty years later, six other states joined
California in adopting central panels, including Colorado, Florida,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Tennessee. 24  By
2002, the total number of states employing central panels was
25 26twenty-five,25 including Louisiana.
There are two major policy reasons for using central panels,
both of which are inherently based upon the structure and nature of
traditional agency adjudications. The first reason is the lack of
public confidence in the administrative adjudication process.27
This was certainly an important impetus for the amendments to
Louisiana's APA as noted by LSU Law Professor Paul R. Baier in
his amicus curiae brief to the Louisiana Supreme Court in the
19. Id. at 58.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 57.
24. Id.
25. In addition to those listed in the text above, the other states with central
panels include Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Id. See also Flanagan, supra note 6, at
1357-58.
26. Rossi, supra note 1, at 57.
27. See Swent, supra note 14, at 8-9.
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28Wooley matter. Professor Baier argued that the vast blending of
the roles of regulator, investigator, and adjudicator in the agency as
one entity leaves the public with "an impression of bias and
unfairness.
29
Concern over this public sentiment of agency bias is
strengthened by Professor Daye's empirical analysis of AU
decisions and judicial review in North Carolina prior to the 2000
amendments to its APA.3°  One of his conclusions is that,
generally, individuals do not succeed in administrative
adjudications. This conclusion is based upon the fact that
seventy-six percent of the 3,470 administrative hearings conducted
by the Office of Administrative Hearings in North Carolina from
321985 through 1999 favored the agencies involved. Thus, when
the public participates in the administrative adjudication process
and only succeeds against agencies twenty-four percent of the
time, this discourages the public's confidence to the point of
frustration, rendering citizens unwilling to even try pressing their
case.
Even though this empirical study illustrates an important policy
concern that must be addressed by a fair APA system, there are
two limitations to Professor Daye's study. First, the merits of the
individual cases on which this data is based are not taken into
account. 33 As a result, there is no indication as to the number of
cases in which the result against the regulated entity or individual
was correct according to the facts and applicable law. Second,
settled cases are not accounted for in this study.34 Thus, there is no
indication of how such cases would affect the findings of this
study. Despite these minor limitations, however, it is quite clear
that the trend toward central panels is growing because of the
public's perception of the inherent unfairness in traditional
agencies' blended roles, as well as in the agencies having complete
control over ALJs.
28. Original Brief on the Merits of Amicus Curiae Paul R. Baer, Professor
of Law, LSU Law Center, in Partial Support of the Judgment Below at 13-14,
Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 04-0882 (La. 2005), 893 So. 2d 746
[hereinafter Amicus Baer].
29. Id. at 12-13.
30. Charles E. Daye, Powers of Administrative Law Judges, Agencies, and
Courts: An Analytical and Empirical Assessment, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1571, 1577
(2001).
31. Id. at 1615. See also Flanagan, supra note 6, at 1391.
32. Daye, supra note 30, at 1615. See also Flanagan, supra note 6, at 1391.
33. Daye, supra note 30, at 1614.
34. Id.
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The second major policy reason for the trend toward central
panels is the need for increased ALJ independence. These two
calls for reform are closely related in that increased ALT
independence is intended to remedy the lack of public confidence.
If ALJs are completely separated from the individual agencies'
control, then the public's perception of fairness improves as
agency bias is lessened.35
Because of the interconnected nature of these two policy
concerns, the Louisiana Legislature intended to increase ALJ
independence as well. As Professor Baier noted, "it is quite plain
that the Louisiana Legislature focused exclusively on creating the
Division of Administrative Law so as to make its administrative
law judges independent of agency control and influence." 36 Thus,
many states, including Louisiana, take these important policy
concerns seriously by incorporating central panels. However, as
crucial as these policy concerns may be, states must be mindful
that their state constitutions are supreme to policy. This requires
careful weighing of these policy interests against inherent
constitutional principles.
II. LOUISIANA'S APA AND THE WOOLEY V. STATE FARM
CONUNDRUM
A. Louisiana's APA
To understand the constitutional concerns presented in Wooley,
one must first be familiar with Louisiana's APA. This section
analyzes the two amendments to Louisiana's APA which caused
such controversy in the Wooley matter. This section continues by
analyzing the facts of the Brown and Wooley matters, and by
examining the trial court's oral reasons for judgment in Wooley.
Finally, the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision and rationales are
examined.
1. Creation of Louisiana's Central Panel
In 1967, Louisiana, along with many other states, adopted
much of the 1961 Model State APA.37 The 1961 Model State APA
made little reference to ALJs and thus, prior to 1995 the
relationship between agencies and ALJs was not addressed.38 As
35. See Flanagan, supra note 6, at 1383.
36. See Anicus Baier, supra note 28, at 12-13.
37. See Bybee, supra note 4, at 444.
38. See supra Part I.A.
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Professor Bybee points out, "[u]ntil the recent amendments, the
Louisiana APA contained but a single reference to 'administrative
hearing officer.' 39 However, all of this changed in 1995 when the
Louisiana Legislature enacted Acts No. 739 (hereinafter "DAL
amendment"), which created a new Division of Administrative
Law within the Louisiana Department of Civil Service.40
Even though a full examination of the changes effected by this
amendment is beyond the scope of this article, 4 1 one change in
particular merits special attention here. Louisiana Revised Statutes
49:992(B)(2) states, "[iln an adjudication commenced by the
division, the administrative law judge shall issue the final decision
or order, whether or not on rehearing, and the agency shall have no
authority to override such decision or order.'4  With these
provisions, the legislature effectively revoked the agency's right to
review. On June 29, 2005, following the Supreme Court's
decision in Wooley, the Louisiana Legislature amended Revised
Statutes 49:992(B)(2) to add the following sentence: "Upon the
issuance of such a final decision or order, the agency or any
official thereof shall comply fully.3 with the final order or decision
of the administrative law judge." As Professor Bybee observed,
"[n]o longer do agency heads have the ability to reverse-under
any circumstances, with or without explanation-an AL's
decision.
4 4
As a result, even though agencies are delegated the authority
by the legislature to make law and policy through administrative
adjudications, Louisiana agencies must accept the ALJs' decisions
on law and policy. However, as Professor Baler argues, "[t]here is
nothing per se unconstitutional about creating the Administrative
Law Division and separating the quasi-judicative from the
administrative within the Executive Branch. 45 This is because
merely transferring adjudicatory power from one executive branch
agency to another does not run afoul of the constitutional doctrine
of separation of powers. Since it is constitutional for traditional
agencies to exercise adjudicatory power due to the demise of the
39. See Bybee, supra note 4, at 451.
40. 1995 La. Acts No. 739, § 2 (codified at La. R.S. 49:991-99 (2003 &
Supp. 2005)). See also Bybee, supra note 4, at 452.
41. See Bybee, supra note 4, at 451-54, for a more in-depth look at the
other changes effected by this amendment.
42. La. R.S. 49:992(B)(2) (2003 & Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).
43. 2005 La. Acts No. 204 (codified at La. R.S. 49:992(B)(2) (Supp. 2006)).
44. See Bybee, supra note 4, at 455.
45. See Amicus Baier, supra note 28, at 14.
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non-delegation doctrine in modem administrative law analysis, 46 it
is also constitutional for a newly created central agency to perform
the same power.
2. Legislative Preclusion ofAgency-Initiated Judicial Review
Constitutional concerns may not arise with the DAL
amendment; however, the same cannot be said of the second
amendment. In 1999, the Louisiana Legislature amended
Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:992(B)(3) by enacting Acts No.
1332 (hereinafter "Judicial Review amendment"), which states:
"[h]owever, no agency or official thereof, or other person acting on
behalf of an agency or official thereof, shall be entitled to judicial
review of a decision made pursuant to this Chapter."4 4 The
Judicial Review amendment also changed Louisiana Revised
Statutes 49:964(A), by adding subsection (A)(2), which provides:
"[n]o agency or official thereof, or other person acting on behalf of
an agency or official thereof shall be entitled to judicial review
under this Chapter."
48
Finally, the provisions on the right to seek judicial review of
ALJ final decisions were revised to excluded agencies from the
definition of "persons" who could seek such review.49 The major
policy reason for imposing these rules against agency-initiated
judicial review in an APA system with AJ finality focused on
protecting regulated entities and individuals from being placed "in
the position of having to compete in the judicial system a ainst the
power and unlimited financial backing of the state."" Thus,
46. McGrath et al., Project: State Judicial Review of Administrative Action,
43 Admin. L. Rev. 571, 579-93 (1991).
47. 1999 La. Acts No. 1332.
48. Id.
49. See La. R.S. 49:951(5) (2003) ("'Person' means any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, governmental subdivision, or public or
private organization of any character other than an agency, except that an
agency is a 'person' for the purpose of appealing an administrative ruling in a
disciplinary action brought pursuant to Title 37 of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950 prior to the final adjudication of such disciplinary action.").
50. Original Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Louisiana Legislature at
4, Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 04-0882 (La. 2005), 893 So. 2d
746 (citing minutes and audiotape of the House & Governmental Affairs
Committee on May 6, 1999) [hereinafter Amicus Legislature]. See also Brief
Filed on Behalf of Ann Wise in Her Capacity as Director of the Division of
Administrative Law at 19, Wooley, 04-0882, 893 So. 2d 746 (citing minutes of
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agencies were thought to be in a better position to use the judicial
system than regulated entities and individuals would be. As a
result, the legislature thought the only way to sufficiently "level
the playing field" was to deny agency-initiated judicial review. 51
It is important to note that agencies have not generally had the
right to judicial review because agencies managed their own
adjudications, and even with ALJs involved, the agencies had the
final say.52 Thus, there was "no need to appeal a self-imposed
adverse decision." 53  However, agency-initiated judicial review
becomes important when an administrative court style central
panel, which provides for ALJ finality, is established because the
agency needs some mechanism to fulfill its delegated duty,
especially when it believes the ALJ has made legal error or poor
policy.
With Louisiana's preclusion of agency-initiated judicial
review, the legislature rendered Louisiana agencies powerless to
make and enforce law and policy through administrative
adjudications. Without a chance to review the AL's decision, the
agency does not have a say in the final agency decision. In a
central panel system, which has final order authority, the only way
to contest a decision with which the agency disagrees is through
the courts in judicial review. However, even this avenue is closed
off to Louisiana agencies. It is this last step, closing off agency-
initiated judicial review in a system with AJ finality, that raises
constitutional concerns regarding the inherent power of both the
judicial and executive branches, which will be discussed in more
detail infra in Section III.
B. The Wooley Conundrum
1. The Facts and Procedural History in Brown and in Wooley
The dispute in both Brown and Wooley arose over an insurance
policy form, for rental condominium unit owners, which State
Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (hereinafter State
the House & Governmental Affairs Committee on May 6, 1999, at p. 12)
[hereinafter Director's Brief].
51. Amicus Legislature, supra note 50, at 4. See also Director's Brief,
supra note 50, at 19.
52. See Bybee, supra note 4, at 457.
53. Id.
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Farm) wanted approved.54 Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:620
requires that such an insurance policy form must be "filed with and
approved by the commissioner of insurance" before it may be
"issued, delivered, or used., 55 Pursuant to this statute, State Farm
filed their policy form for review and approval.56 The Department
of Insurance (hereinafter "Department") rejected the submitted
policy form because the Department believed the representations
and warranties provision did not comply with applicable insurance
law.5
7
During the time that State Farm's policy form was under
review, the DAL amendment was enacted transferring all
adjudicatory power from the administrative agencies to the
Division of Administrative Law (hereinafter "DAL").58 As a
result, an ALJ of the Louisiana DAL presided at the hearing
regarding State Farm's policy form. This AJ ruled in favor of
State Farm and against the Commissioner of Insurance (hereinafter
"COI") and the Department. The AJ ordered the Department to
approve the contested policy form as submitted.59
In response, the COI filed a petition for judicial review of the
ALJ's decision in the matter of Brown v. State Farm,60
notwithstanding the fact that the definition of "person" explicitly
excluded administrative agencies. 6 1 While this case was pending
before the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, the Louisiana
Legislature passed the Judicial Review amendment in 1999
specifically precluding agency-initiated judicial review of adverse
ALJ decisions.62 The Brown matter culminated before Louisiana's
54. Original Brief on the Merits of the Defendant-Appellant State Farm Fire
& Cas. Ins. Co. at 1, Wooley, 04-0882, 893 So. 2d 746 [hereinafter Appellant's
Original Brief].
55. La. R.S. 22:620 (A)(1) (2003).
56. See Appellant's Original Brief, supra note 54; see also Original Brief on
the Merits of the Plaintiff-Appellee J. Robert Wooley, Commissioner of Ins.,
State of La. at 1, Wooley, 04-0882, 893 So. 2d 746 [hereinafter Appellee's
Original Brief].
57. See Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 502-311 (19th Jud.
Dist. Ct. Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/la/briefs/
statefarmdc.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2006).
58. Id.
59. See Appellant's Original Brief, supra note 54.
60. Brown v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 00-0539 (La. App. 1st Cir.
6/22/01), 804 So. 2d 41.
61. See La. R.S. 49:951(5) (2003); see also Appellant's Original Brief,
supra note 54; see also Appellee's Original Brief, supra note 56.
62. See La. R.S. 49:964(A), 992(B)(3) (2003 & Supp. 2005).
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First Circuit Court of Appeal, where the issue was whether the trial
court correctly dismissed State Farm's exception of no right of
action based upon the COI's lack of any right to seek judicial
review of an AU decision.
63
The first circuit affirmed the trial court's decision because of
the legislature's strong intention to limit agency-initiated judicial
review.64 More importantly for the Wooley matter, the first circuit
affirmed the trial court's denial of the COI's request to amend his
petition to allege a constitutional infringement on the judiciary.
The court did so because "[t]he proposed amendment apparently
would not merely add a cause of action or a party, but would
substitute one lawsuit for another changing the parties, the form of
procedure, and the relief sought."' 5 The court would be required to
modify a petition for judicial review into a declaratory judgment
matter, which would not be appropriate.
66
Thus, any res judicata or issue preclusion claims in the Wooley
matter ultimately failed because Wooley alleged the substance of
the refused amendment in an action for declaratory judgment,
rather than a petition for judicial review. 67 In Wooley, the COI
asked the court to declare both the DAL amendment and the
Judicial Review amendment unconstitutional. 68  The COI also
sought to enjoin the operations of the DAL.69  The trial court
conducted a hearing on the permanent injunction.7 ° Upon the trial
court's determination that both statutes were unconstitutional, State
Farm filed an appeal with the Louisiana State Supreme Court.7'
2. The Trial Court's Oral Reasons for Judgment
The trial court ultimately held both the DAL amendment and
the Judicial Review amendment unconstitutional. The trial court
63. 804 So. 2d41.
64. Id. at 45-46; see also Amicus Baier, supra note 28, at 6.
65. Brown, 804 So. 2d at 47.
66. Id.
67. See Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 04-0882 (La. 2005), 893
So. 2d 746, 771-72 ("[A]ithough the judgment of the [First Circuit] court of
appeal in the previous litigation was final, State Farm's exception of res judicata
was properly denied as the instant cause of action [Wooley] did not arise out of
the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the litigation.").
68. See Appellant's Original Brief, supra note 54, at 2.
69. Id.
70. See Appellant's Original Brief, supra note 54, at 3; see also Appellee's
Original Brief, supra note 56, at 2.
71. See Appellant's Original Brief, supra note 54, at 4.
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found, as fact, that similar policy forms submitted by other foreign
insurers operating in Louisiana were rejected, and those insurers
accepted the agency's interpretation, unlike State Farm.72 Even
though the trial court found several constitutional infringements,
only the relevant findings are briefly discussed here.
First, the trial court held that both amendments violated the
separation of powers doctrine by vesting judicial power in the
executive branch, 7 3and by obliterating a judicial check on the
executive branch. Second, the court urged that the Judicial
Review amendment violated the separation of powers doctrine by
diminishing the Judiciary's power to hear matters involving
questions of law.
Third, the DAL amendment was held violative of Article V,
Louisiana's judiciary article, by divesting the district courts of
original jurisdiction. 5  The trial court viewed the DAL as an
independent judiciary within the executive branch, limited only by
76the executive branch and not by the judicial branch. Finally, the
trial court concluded that the Judicial Review amendment was
unconstitutional because it denied the representative of the citizens
of Louisiana, the COI, the opportunity to protect their interests
against an illegal policy form through judicial review. 77
3. The Louisiana Supreme Court Speaks
As a result of Louisiana's unique APA, which combines a
central panel system of ALJ finality with a preclusion of agency-
initiated judicial review, the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision
in Wooley will be examined in-depth by administrative and
constitutional scholars, lawyers, and legislators around the country.
If the rationale supporting either the constitutionality or the
unconstitutionality of such a system is convincing, other states
might be encouraged to either follow Louisiana's lead or to view
Wooley as persuasive authority to not go as far as Louisiana did.
With such an important and possibly trend-setting decision, it is
quite unfortunate that the Louisiana Supreme Court was only half
right in their decision. The court correctly held the DAL
72. See Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 502-311 (19th Jud.
Dist. Ct. Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://biotech.law.Isu.edu/la/briefs/state-
farmdc.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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amendment to be constitutionally sound; however, it spent entirely
too much time on irrelevant arguments supporting the
constitutionality of this amendment.78
The major constitutional concern in this case was not the DAL
amendment itself, but rather the Judicial Review amendment in
combination with the DAL amendment. It is the contention of this
comment that had the Louisiana Legislature stopped with the DAL
amendment, no constitutional concerns would have surfaced. Yet,
Louisiana went a step too far in combining a denial of agency-
initiated judicial review with a system of AU finality. Apparently,
the Louisiana Supreme Court disagrees, at least as far as can be
seen from a thirty-nine page opinion of which only about four
pages are dedicated to discussing the major issue in this case, the
constitutionality of the Judicial Review amendment.
The court quickly, and cavalierly, dismissed any claims that the
Judicial Review amendment was unconstitutional by holding "that
under the particular factual circumstances presented in this matter,
the Commissioner has not shown Act 1332 [Judicial Review
amendment] to be unconstitutional. '79 Thus, the court applied a
heavy burden on the COI to prove this amendment was
unconstitutional because of the general presumption that statutes
are constitutional. 8° The court then opined as to the possibility of
the COI bringing a declaratory judgment when he believed the ALJ
made legal error, even though the court itself admitted that "it is
questionable whether [the COI] could change the result of the
underlying adjudication." 81 The court then remanded to the first
circuit court of appeals to decide whether the COT was entitled to
seek declaratory judgment on the issue of whether the RCU policy
form complied with the law, and whether the district court was
correct in determining that it did not comply. 82 The remand was
issued even though the first circuit had never heard this case before
because it was directly appealed from the district court to the
Louisiana Supreme Court.
There are four rationales upon which the court based its
Judicial Review amendment decision. First, the principle that state
78. See Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 04-0882 (La. 2005), 893
So. 2d 746, 761-67 (an in-depth examination of the bases on which the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the DAL amendment is beyond the scope of this
article, which focuses on a thorough critique of the bases on which the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Judicial Review amendment).
79. Id. at 768.
80. Id. at 761.
81. Id. at 770.
82. Id. at 772.
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agencies cannot appeal decisions made by other state agencies
precludes the COI from seeking judicial review of this new
executive branch agency's decisions. 3 Second, since the COI has
no constitutionally-defined powers and duties, he only has the
constitutional right to exist, and only the legislature "has the right
to define his powers and duties. ' 84 The implication being that
since the legislature specifically disallowed the COI the right to
seek judicial review, he has no constitutional claim to such a right.
Third, since an agency or the COT representing the agency is not a
"person" intended to be protected by Article I of the Louisiana
Constitution, neither the agency itself nor the COI has a
constitutional right to access the courts.8 5  Finally, the court
concluded that because "ALJs make administrative law rulings that
are not subject to enforcement and do not have the force of law,"
there was no constitutional problem of the executive overstepping
the judiciary.86 Upon examination of the court's decision as a
whole, this last rationale appears to underlie the court's ultimate
decision to uphold the constitutionality of Louisiana's current
APA. All of these arguments and rationales advanced by the court
will be analyzed and critiqued in the next section, infra.
4. The Louisiana Legislature Reacts
On June 29, 2005, following the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision in Wooley, the Louisiana Legislature amended Revised
Statutes 49:992(B)(2) to add the following sentence: "Upon the
issuance of such a final decision or order, the agency or any
official thereof shall comply fully with the final order or decision
of the administrative law judge."87  The problem with this
amendment is that it negates the underlying rationale advanced by
the Wooley court in favor of the constitutionality of Louisiana's
current APA. If the agency against whom the ALJ ruled is now
statutorily compelled to fully comply with the AL's final order,
then it cannot be logically argued that ALJs make "rulings that are
not subject to enforcement and do not have the force of law."88
If the agency is compelled to follow the ALJ's final decision,
then that decision may be enforced against the agency, and thus the
83. Id. at 768-69.
84. Id. at 770.
85. Id. at 768.
86. ld. at 764.
87. 2005 La. Acts No. 204, § 1; see also supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
88. Wooley, 893 So. 2d at 764.
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decision has the force of law as it pertains to all parties involved in
the matter. This is because the agency must comply with the
ALJ's decision, which is in favor of the regulated entity or
individual, and this regulated party is free to act in a manner
consistent with the ALJ's final decision. Given this new
amendment, the Louisiana Supreme Court must revisit this issue in
light of the legislature's obliteration of the court's underlying
rationale for upholding the constitutionality of Louisiana's current
APA.
III. ANALYSIS OF LOUISIANA'S APA AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.",89 With these simple, eloquent
words, Chief Justice Marshall mobilized the antiquated legal
system in the United States toward the judicial review of today.
Despite the vast number of times historians and scholars alike have
quoted this important language, students of the law, as well as
citizens of this great country, often take for granted exactly what
Chief Justice Marshall accomplished with this statement.
With the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison,90 the United
States Supreme Court laid to rest any lingering doubt regarding
whose right and duty it was to interpret the law. It clearly lies with
the courts through judicial review. This is a tremendous power and
responsibility that is not to be taken lightly. As a result, any time
Congress or a state legislature denies judicial review, courts should
strictly scrutinize that denial lest these foundational principles
upon which our entire legal system is based be placed in jeopardy.
This section analyzes the constitutional arguments against the
Judicial Review amendment and critiques the arguments and
rationales advanced by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Wooley.
As this section details, the ultimate conclusion the court should
have reached is that the Judicial Review amendment is
unconstitutional because it impermissibly infringes on both the
judicial and executive branches. Nevertheless, the Louisiana
Supreme Court correctly determined that the trial court was
incorrect in striking the DAL amendment down as unconstitutional
because a central panel with final order authority does not
necessarily run afoul of the separation of powers doctrine.
89. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
90. Id.
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Additionally, this section details how the lack of a right to seek
judicial review "changes the nature of the power exercised by the
AU," which the court specifically found the COI had not shown in
Wooley.91 Finally, this section illustrates how Louisiana went a
step too far in combining a system of final order authority with a
denial of agency-initiated judicial review. The remedy to this
problem is not to strike both amendments, but instead to strike the
unconstitutional denial of agency-initiated judicial review, while
maintaining Louisiana's administrative court style of central panel.
A. Infringement on the Judicial Branch
1. Crucial Check on Executive Branch Obliterated
Louisiana's current APA raises several separation of powers
concerns. First, the denial of agency-initiated judicial review in
combination with a central panel of ALJ finality is problematic
because this prohibition obliterates a crucial check on executive
branch activities. Many scholars advocate that "judicial review of
administrative actions provides a crucial check on the delegation of
executive powers." 92  When the legislature passes a law and
delegates the authority to promulgate, enforce, and interpret
corresponding regulations to an agency, the courts through judicial
review are the only guardians against abuse by executive branch
agencies. As a result, all agency and all AU decisions must be
open for judicial review to protect against executive branch
excesses.
However, Louisiana's system, as a central panel with ALJ
finality, transfers the adjudicatory powers of traditional agencies to
the ALJs in its central panel, which is also a part of the executive
branch.93 In effect, the Louisiana system allows decisional finality
where it has never been allowed before. Even under the old
Louisiana system modeled after the 1961 Model Act,94 final
agency decisions were subject to judicial review by Louisiana
courts. Since traditional agency decisions were always subject to
judicial review, final ALJ decisions substituting for agency
decisions in Louisiana's new central panel must be as well.
91. Wooley, 04-0882, 893 So. 2d at 769.
92. McGrath et al., supra note 46, at 577.
93. See La. R.S. 49:995 (2003). This statute states the Director of the DAL
is to be appointed by the Governor. Thus, both the Director of the DAL and the
DAL itself operate within the Executive Branch.
94. See supra Part I.A.
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Louisiana's Judicial Review amendment denies agency-
initiated judicial review of adverse ALJ decisions. Thus, if an ALJ
rules against the agency in favor of the regulated entity or
individual, the agency cannot seek judicial review of that decision.
Consequently, a particular kind of executive branch activity, that
of the ALJ ruling against the agency, escapes judicial scrutiny
under this scheme of precluding agency-initiated judicial review.
Therefore, a crucial check on a particular kind of executive branch
activity is eviscerated, leaving room for executive branch excesses.
For example, suppose there is a renegade AU who is truly a
"man of the people" and who wants to be active in acquiring as
many favorable decisions for aggrieved persons as possible.
Suppose further, as in a situation similar to Wooley, there is an ALJ
who is truly in favor of regulated entities, and as a result, he or she
consistently rules in favor of regulated entities, such as State Farm.
Regulated entities engage in a wide spectrum of activities that must
be regulated not just to protect citizens from financial ruin, but also
to provide for the citizens' safety and well-being. One example is
that of nuclear power plants. If an ALJ consistently rules in favor
of the nuclear power plant industry, there will be less regulation.
Since regulated entities are normally in favor of less regulation to
keep their costs down, such a renegade ALJ would seriously
undermine the agency's delegated duty to enforce the statute's
regulations. Such a scenario endangers the persons intended to be
protected by the applicable regulations.
Even worse, under Louisiana's current APA, such culpable
activity is not subject to any judicial scrutiny because, as long as
the ALJ rules against the agency, whatever the ALJ says has no
chance of judicial review. As a result, the ALJs rule the world of
administrative law in Louisiana. One scholar aptly recognized,
"U]udicial review . . . provides protection against improper or
illegal administrative action." 95 As illustrated here, in the absence
of judicial review, impropriety reigns.
As stated by Judge James L. Dennis of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, "[t]he underlying constitutional
conception [of separation of powers concerns] is that those with
governmental power must be subject to the limits of law, and that
the limits should be determined, not by those institutions whose
authority is in question, but by an impartial judiciary."96
Louisiana's Judicial Review amendment ignores this important
95. McGrath et al., supra note 46, at 577.
96. Judge James L. Dennis, Judicial Power and the Administrative State, 62
La. L. Rev. 59, 74 (2001).
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constitutional conception because, when ALJs rule against the
agencies involved, those decisions are not subject to review "by an
impartial judiciary. 97 Since ALJs now have the power to conduct
administrative adjudications, all of their decisions must be open for
judicial review, not just some, so that the judiciary may be able to
set the limits of the ALJs' power instead of the limits being set by
the executive branch central panel itself.
Since Louisiana's denial of judicial review destroys a check on
executive branch power by, not only allowing decisional finality
where it has never been allowed before, but also by denying
judicial review of a particular kind of executive branch activity, the
judiciary's power to say what the law is by overseeing the
executive branch has been invaded. Thus, the equilibrium between
the judicial branch and the executive branch is necessarily
compromised in contravention to Louisiana's separation of powers
doctrine as constitutionally provided by Article II, Sections 1 and
2.98
2. Divestiture of the Jurisdiction of Article V Courts and
Agency Appeals
A second concern raised by Louisiana's current APA is
whether the legislature has deprived Article V courts of
jurisdiction by creating an administrative court, the DAL, and
coupling that with a denial of agency-initiated judicial review.99
Consideration of this question is important for Louisiana, and also
for proponents in favor of installing a central panel in the federal
APA because, as urged by Judge Dennis, "Article V and Article II
[of the United States Constitution] appear designed to promote the
same basic values and objects." In order to fully appreciate the
merits of this concern regarding the deprivation of Article V
jurisdiction, it must be placed in the proper context.
Article V vests "original jurisdiction" of civil matters in a
"supreme court, courts of appeal, district courts, and other courts
authorized by this Article," and it also provides for appellate
jurisdiction. 100 However, classification of administrative
adjudications as "civil matters" creates confusion with respect to
the concept of administrative agencies. Any argument that the
legislature has divested Article V courts of jurisdiction, which is
made on a strict, non-delegation, separation of powers theory, calls
97. Id.
98. La. Const. art. II, §§ 1-2.
99. See Bybee, supra note 4, at 462.
100. La. Const. art. V, §§ 1, 16(B).
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into question the quasi-judicial functions of agencies. As has been
clear for some time, such a strict interpretation of the separation of
powers doctrine is stunted by an "inexorable growth of the
administrative state."''
°
In the correct context, however, this concern of stripping
Article V courts of their "appellate" rather than "original"
jurisdiction has merit. When Article V courts are divested of their
appellate jurisdiction, a crucial check on the executive branch is
destroyed, as discussed supra. Therefore, these two constitutional
infringements are very closely related. The major "transfer of
power" argument urged in brief and at oral arguments in favor of
the Director of the DAL in Wooley is the perfect illustration of this
point. As stated in brief by Daniel Webb, attorney for the director,
Simply put, one of the purposes of Act 739 (creation of the
DAL) was to transfer the final decision making authority
from the Executive Branch departments to the DAL. The
Legislature in making that determination did not "strip"
the Judicial Branch of its jurisdiction. Rather it simply
transferred an Executive Branch function from one
Executive Branch agency to another Executive Branch
agency. It also made the Administrative Law System of
Louisiana much fairer to its citizens.
10 2
The gist of this argument is that the powers exercised by
traditional agencies were merely transferred to the insulated DAL,
which is just another agency within the executive branch. As a
result of this transfer, the judicial branch is not stripped of any
jurisdiction because matters formerly adjudicated by traditional
agencies are currently adjudicated by the central panel agency, the
DAL.
While the transfer of authority part of this argument is certainly
true, the rest of the argument ignores one important fact.
Historically, all executive branch agencies have been subject to
judicial review. In his law review article published in 2001, after
the passage of Louisiana's Judicial Review amendment, Judge
Dennis outlined the following factors on which administrative
agencies were subject to review by the courts: (1) violations of the
constitution or statutory provisions; (2) exceeding the statutory
authority of the agency; (3) unlawful procedure; (4) errors of law;
(5) arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion; and (6) manifest
error in view of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
101. McGrath et al., supra note 46, at 579.
102. See Director's Brief, supra note 50, at 7.
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whole record. 0 3 From this, it is quite clear that agency decisions
have been and continue to be subject to judicial review, and a
rather searching review at that. This is especially true of decisions
of law and of policy.
Judge Dennis urges that "[t]he 1974 [the current] Louisiana
Constitution plainly vests in courts established and authorized by
Article V the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional and to
review the actions of the executive branch of government."''
4
Since the DAL is merely another executive branch agency, and
because agency decisions are subject to rather searching judicial
scrutiny, ALJ decisions adverse to the agencies involved must also
be subject to the same judicial review. If not, then Louisiana
Article V courts have been divested of their appellate jurisdiction
to oversee particular executive branch actions for the factors noted
by Judge Dennis.
It seems the Louisiana Supreme Court either overlooked or
ignored Judge Dennis' article even though it was put before them
by Amicus Baier. Perhaps the result in Wooley would have been
different had adequate attention been given to these important
considerations. One of the bases for the court's decision was the
principle that state agencies cannot appeal decisions made by other
state agencies, thus precluding the COI from seeking judicial
review of this new executive branch agency's decisions.
Yet therein lies the problem-all decisions by traditional
agencies were always subject to judicial review. Now, this new
DAL agency is not subject to judicial review as long as the AJ
rules against the agency. This subset of executive branch decisions
escapes judicial scrutiny, which has never before occurred with
traditional agencies. The principle that state agencies cannot
appeal decisions of other state agencies was formulated in an era
where agency heads made the final agency decisions. 10 6 Since the
103. See Dennis, supra note 96, at 94 (citing Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La.
Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1158 (La. 1984)).
104. See Dennis, supra note 96, at 78-79 (citing La. Const. Art. V, § 5(D);
Progressive Sec. Ins. Co. v. Foster, 711 So. 2d 675 (La. 1998); Bruneau v.
Edwards, 517 So. 2d 818 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987); Carso v. Bd. of Liquidation
of State Debt, 205 La. 368, 17 So. 2d 358 (1944); Graham v. Jones, 198 La. 507,
3 So. 2d 761 (1941)).
105. See Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 04-0882 (La. 2005), 893
So. 2d 746, 768-70.
106. Id. (citing State through Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corrs., Office of State
Police, Riverboat Gaming Div. v. La. Riverboat Gaming Comm'n, 94-1872,
(La. 1995), 655 So. 2d 292). It is important to note that even though this case
recognizes the common law principle that agencies cannot seek judicial review
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agencies had a mechanism that allowed them to perform their
delegated duty to make law and policy through administrative
adjudications, other non-interested agencies had no right to
contradict decisions made by other agencies.
Now that all agency adjudications have been transplanted to
one central executive agency, the agencies themselves have been
cut out of the process leaving them no other alternative but to seek
judicial review when they disagree with the central panel's
determination. The agencies must have a mechanism that allows
them to perform their delegated duty. Therefore, the "established
principle" that agencies cannot seek judicial review of other
agency decisions, which was liberally applied by the court in
Wooley, is inapplicable to Louisiana's current APA where final
agency decisions are made by one centralized agency that escapes
judicial scrutiny as long as the ALT rules against the agency
involved. If the right to handle all agency adjudications transferred
to the DAL, surely the traditional obligation to have all agency
decisions subject to judicial review likewise transferred to the
DAL.
With this denial of judicial review of certain ALT decisions,
which are now final agency decisions, this new central panel
agency has greater rights than any other agency has ever had.
Namely, this new agency is not subject to judicial review when the
ALJs rule against the traditional agencies. Just as Louisiana's
Judicial Review amendment obliterates a crucial check on the
executive branch, 10 7 it also divests the judiciary's inherent power
and jurisdiction to oversee certain executive branch ALJ decisions.
Such a scheme is not constitutionally acceptable.
3. Divestiture of the Judiciary's Inherent Authority to Decide
Questions of Law
The final concern raised by Louisiana's current APA is that the
judiciary has been divested of its inherent authority to hear and
decide questions of law. Many ALJ decisions adverse to agencies
involve questions of law. Thus, a denial of judicial review of those
decisions is in effect a denial of judicial review of questions of
law. The more likely scenario is that many ALT decisions adverse
to agencies will be mixed questions of law, fact, and policy.
of other agency decisions, this recognition was based on the previous APA prior
to the DAL amendment, which according to Act No. 739 took effect on and after
October 1, 1996. Therefore, this principle remains inapplicable to the current
LAPA.
107. See supra Part III.A.1.
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However, it is this denial of review of questions of law that raises
the biggest concern among constitutional scholars. In Wooley, the
ALJ made a determination on the application of the Insurance
Code to State Farm's submitted policy form. Since the ALJ
decided to approve State Farm's policy form, this decision of law
was contrary to the agency's interpretation of regulations
promulgated by the agency itself.
According to Louisiana's Judicial Review amendment, this
determination of law is un-reviewable by Louisiana courts because
it is adverse to the agency. This is a more serious constitutional
infraction than the destruction of a judicial check on the executive
branch, which results in the divestiture of the jurisdiction of Article
V courts. This is because the judiciary is being denied the right to
review questions of law, which is the judiciary's premier province.
Thus, the Judicial Review amendment divests the judiciary of its
inherent authority to say what the law is, which unconstitutionally
alters the equilibrium between the judicial and executive branches.
B. Infringement on the Executive Branch
1. The COI's Core Function and Delegated Duty
As posed by Professor Rossi in his recent nationwide analysis
of the increasing trend toward ALJ finality, "if-as in
Louisiana-a state agency is prohibited from appealing a final ALJ
order (only private parties are afforded appellate remedies) would
this undermine the legislature's delegation of policy decisions to
the agency or otherwise interfere with powers at the core of
politically accountable executive branch agencies?" 10 8  This
question encapsulates the issues the Judicial Review amendment
raises with respect to its infringement on the executive branch. At
oral arguments in Wooley, many of the questions posed by both
Justice Kimball and Justice Weimer focused on whether there is
any core function in the COI, 10 9 as well as whether the COI has
any inherent authority that might be endangered by the denial of
agency-initiated judicial review. 110
Before one can fully appreciate these two inquiries, as well as
the court's response, it is necessary to understand the actual
dynamics of the situation posed in the Wooley case. In the dispute
between State Farm and the COI, the only representative of the
108. See Rossi, supra note 1, at 65.
109. Commissioner of Insurance.
110. The author was present at oral arguments before the Louisiana Supreme
Court on Sept. 7, 2004.
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people was the COI who was duly elected, as constitutionally and
statutorily provided. This fact was highlighted during oral
arguments before the Louisiana Supreme Court when the attorney
for State Farm argued that "the COI should not be allowed to
prevent the marketing of the State Farm policy forms.""' The
main reason the COI has stood in such staunch opposition to the
marketing of this policy form is because he does not believe that it
complies with the law. The COI has a statutory duty to ensure that
all approved policy forms comply with applicable Insurance Code
regulations promulgated by the Department of Insurance of which
the COI is the agency head."
2
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:2(A)(1) specifically states that
"[i]nsurance is an industry affected with the public interest and it is
the purpose of this Code to regulate that industry in all its phases ....
It shall be the duty of the commissioner of insurance to administer
the provisions of this Code."'" 3 Thus, a logical inference is that the
COI, as the duly elected officer in charge of the Department of
Insurance, has the duty of protecting the public interest regarding
insurance. This duty is adjunct to the COT's responsibility to
"administer the provisions" of the Insurance Code. A denial of
agency-initiated judicial review in a system with ALJ finality
necessarily infringes upon the Executive COI's ability to fully
discharge his duty to protect the public interest regarding
insurance. Absent a right in the COI to challenge the ALJ's
approval of the policy form, no one else would be able to protect
the public from what the COI considers to be an illegal policy
form.
Therefore, it could be reasonably argued that one of the
functions, powers, or duties inherent in the COI's position, as a
politically accountable entity, is that of protecting the public
interest. If the field of insurance is truly "affected with the public
interest, ' 4 then surely the core function of the COI, as the
guardian charged with the duty of administering the Insurance
Code, is to administer the Code in such a way as to protect the
public interest.
Yet the Louisiana Supreme Court disagrees. The court in
Wooley took great pains to establish the history surrounding the
indoctrination of the COT as a constitutional entity. The court
ultimately concluded that since the delegates refused to enumerate
any rights and duties of the COI in the constitution, the rights and
111. Id.
112. La. R.S. 22:620(A)(1) (2003).
113. La. R.S. 22:2(A)(1) (2003).
114. Id.
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duties of the COI could only be created by the legislature by
statute.115 The court used this to support its conclusion that, since
the legislature specifically denied agency-initiated judicial review,
the COI has no such constitutional right. 
6
The opinion's major flaw here is that of form over substance.
The inquiry into a constitutional violation is not foreclosed simply
because the right to seek judicial review is not enumerated in the
constitution as one of the COI's rights and duties. The court's own
excerpts cited in its opinion illustrate the major point of contention
at the constitutional convention was specifying the COI's rate-
making function, 117  which is totally irrelevant to the
constitutionality of the Judicial Review amendment. Whether the
COT is a constitutional entity or not, the COI has a core function,
as well as other rights and duties delegated to it by the legislature.
Thus, a constitutional infraction is possible regardless of the
enumeration of the CO's rights and duties in the constitution
itself.
To adequately perform his administrative duties, the COI must
protect the public interest. With no opportunity to petition a court
of law for judicial review of decisions with which the executive
COT believes is in derogation of the public's interest, the COT is
stripped of his core function and is undermined in performing his
delegated duty. As a result, such an infringement is an
impermissible extension of legislative power into the executive's
realm in contravention of Louisiana's doctrine of separation of
powers, despite the COT having no constitutionally enumerated
rights and duties.
2. Agencies as "Persons" Entitled to Judicial Review
The final basis for the court's decision to uphold the
constitutionality of the Judicial Review amendment was that, since
the agency was not a "person" intended to be protected by Article I
of the Louisiana Constitution, an agency had no constitutional right
to seek judicial review. 18 The court's own language describing
Article I illustrates the irony of this decision, i.e. "[Article T]
protects the rights of individuals against unwarrantable
115. See Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 04-0882 (La. 2005), 893
So. 2d 746, 770.
116. Id. at 768, 770.
117. Id. at759-60.
118. Id. at 768.
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government action and does not shield state agencies from law
passed by the people's duly elected representatives."
' 119
First, the new central panel agency, the DAL, is being shielded
from review by the courts when the ALJs rule against the agency.
Yet there is no protection of the rights of individuals as mandated
by Article I because, absent a right in the COI to seek judicial
review, no one can protect the public's rights. Second, the only
representative of the people in a situation similar to Wooley is the
COI himself who is charged with protecting the public interest as
regards insurance. The COI is trying to vindicate the public's
interest. Finally, the COI is politically accountable for his
decisions whereas, the ALJs in the DAL are not because they are
appointed. Thus, if the public disagrees with an agency decision,
the public has no recourse against the insulated DAL central panel
as they would have against the COI by political control.
As a result, new situations call for new remedies to protect the
intended beneficiaries of law. It is quite clear that Article I of the
Louisiana Constitution was intended to protect the rights of
individuals. In a situation where the only protector of these rights
is denied the ability to seek judicial review of government action,
clearly the true intent and spirit of Article I has been invaded.
With such drastic changes to Louisiana's APA, the court
incorrectly applied law that made sense under the traditional
agency regime, but which now lacks both logic and consistency
with the constitution given this new agency context.
It is as if the current APA has reduced the agency to the
position of an interested party who has no control over the
outcome of the case. In such a situation, both parties should be
entitled to seek judicial review of adverse decisions. Whether such
a result was intended by the legislature, this is the only
constitutionally acceptable scenario in a system with ALJ finality.
This scenario is similar to a situation in which an individual or a
corporation brings suit against the state, and following an adverse
decision against the state, the state appeals to a higher court.
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN LouIsIANA AND THE
CAROLINAS
In order to fully comprehend the gravity of the constitutional
ramifications of Louisiana's APA, this section analyzes the APAs
in two other central panel states. Although South Carolina's APA
119. Id. (citing Bd. of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist. v. Dep't of Natural
Res., 496 So. 2d 281, 287 (La. 1986) (on rehearing)).
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is an example of an extreme "administrative court" style of central
panel, it is not as extreme as Louisiana's APA. North Carolina is a
model of compromise for other states because it has struck the
appropriate balance between competing interests, and unlike
Louisiana's APA, is constitutionally sound.
A. South Carolina's APA-Extreme, But Not as Extreme as
Louisiana
South Carolina's APA is similar to Louisiana's APA in that
both are administrative court style central panels. Scholar William
B. Swent argues that South Carolina blends the central panel
model with the "administrative court" model. 12  The South
Carolina Administrative Law Judge Division (hereinafter AIJD) is
fully within the executive branch, thus it has a "quasi-judicial
nature" as opposed to a purely judicial nature.12 ' This is similar to
Louisiana's DAL, which is fully within the executive branch as
well. 1 2  ALJs in South Carolina render final and immediately
appealable decisions on a variety of issues, 123 just like Louisiana
ALJs. One major difference from Louisiana's APA, however, is
that South Carolina differentiates which issues can be finally
adjudged by ALJs based upon the nature of the agency involved.
First, when an agency is headed by a commission or a board,
the AL's decision is subject to a limited review by the agency
involved prior to issuance of the final agency decision. 124 Because
these agencies are afforded the final say, there is no need for
agency-initiated judicial review. The same is not true of central
panels with final order authority, such as the DAL in Louisiana.
South Carolina provides the needed mechanism to allow agencies
headed by commissions or boards to fulfill their delegated duty,
while respecting the fairness concerns of regulated entities and
individuals.
Second, for agencies headed by a single director, the ALJ's
decision becomes the final agency decision, thus denying the125
agency any final say on the final agency decision. Even though
this scheme is similar to Louisiana's system of ALJ finality, the
major difference is that South Carolina's ALJ final order authority
applies only to a small subset of agencies. Louisiana's ALJ
120. See Swent, supra note 14, at 2.
121. Id. at 5.
122. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
123. See Rossi, supra note 1, at 61.
124. See Swent, supra note 14, at 12.
125. Id. at 13.
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finality applies across the board to all Louisiana agencies except
for very few, specified agencies. If Wooley occurred in South
Carolina, the ALJ's decision would have been final there as it was
in Louisiana because the COI is a single director agency head.
Yet, even this scheme of AJ finality poses no serious
constitutional problems, unless it is coupled with a legislative
denial of agency-initiated judicial review, as is the case with
Louisiana's APA. As long as the agency head is allowed a right to
seek judicial review, there is nothing per se unconstitutional about
a scheme of ALJ final order authority.
126
Finally, occupational and licensing agency boards render final
agency decisions; however, South Carolina's ALJD acts as an
appellate court for these agency decisions.127 Judicial review of
the ALJ appeal is a matter of right, and the courts review the
record developed by the agency. 12 Here, these agencies make the
initial decision, which is subject to review first by the ALJD, and
then by the courts as a matter of right. Since the agency is not
completely cut out of the decision-making process, there are no
overwhelming constitutional concerns with this scheme.
Even though South Carolina is one of the few extreme states
employing ALJ finality in some form, Louisiana's APA is even
more extreme in that it completely denies agency-initiated judicial
review without providing any mechanism for agencies to perform
their delegated duty. Had Louisiana stopped short of completely
cutting off agency-initiated judicial review, its scheme of ALJ
finality would not run afoul of the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers. Unfortunately, the Louisiana Legislature
went a step too far.
B. North Carolina's APA-The Model of Compromise for Other
States
In 2000, North Carolina amended its APA in several significant
ways. Passage of these amendments proved to be quite a long,
hard-fought battle which began in the State House of
Representatives. The bill, as introduced, provided for ALJ finality
of decisions, as well as for agency-initiated judicial review. 129
Obviously, the North Carolina General Assembly was sensitive to
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Even though
126. See Amicus Baier, supra note 28.
127. See Swent, supra note 14, at 12.
128. Id.
129. Brad Miller, What Were We Thinking?: Legislative Intent and the 2000
Amendments to the North Carolina APA, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1657, 1658 (2001).
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the final bill changed substantially due to the ensuing debate and
compromise on ALJ finality, it is quite remarkable that even in its
most extreme form, this North Carolina bill never contemplated
denying agency-initiated judicial review in an APA system with
ALJ finality. Instead, this debate centered on the logistics of
instituting ALJ finality.
The North Carolina Senate received an onslaught of arguments
from both sides of this debate over instituting AU finality. The
supporters of the amendments argued that the procedural
unfairness inherent in allowing one of the parties to a dispute to be
the judge was unacceptable. They also urged that agencies
continuously reject AJ decisions that are not favorable to the
agencies and enter final decisions upholding the agencies'
stance. 13° Finally, the supporters also contended that the AU, has
the benefit of experiencing the witnesses' demeanor under cross-
examination; whereas, the agencies' decisions are usually based
only on the "cold record," which would be equally available to ajudge on judicial review. In other words, the agency should not
be allowed to change the AL's decision because the agency is in
no better position to do so than either the ALJ or a judge on
judicial review.
On the other side of the debate, the opponents of the bill argued
that the AL's duties should not exceed those of a hearing officer
who compiles the record for a final decision to be made by the
agency. 132Any recommended ALJ decision was simply something
to be considered by the agency.133 The opponents also contended
that many decisions turn on issues of expertise fully within the
ambit of the agencies' specialized knowledge, and, as such,
agencies "should not be bound by a lay ALJ fact finding that was
contrary to the agency's expert knowledge." 134 Finally, opponents
urged that the Executive Branch's power to govern by consistently
applying the law would be seriously undermined by giving ALJs
the authority to render final decisions with no opportunity for
agency review. 135
As Professor Daye said, "[t]he [North Carolina] General
Assembly crafted an approach that represents a middle ground., 136
He believes this new legislation changed three areas of North
130. Id. at 1660.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1661.
135. Id.
136. See Daye, supra note 30, at 1579.
Carolina's administrative law: first, it constituted AUs as "quasi-
judicial officials in the executive branch. 1 37  Second, ALJ
decisions are given more effect "without giving ALJs so much
power that they effectively oust agencies of their proper decisional
role."'138 Finally, judicial review is more extensive when agencies
reject the AL's decisions, "while stopping short of transforming
courts into 'super agencies' that usurp statutory powers of
agencies."' 139 In the end, agencies have the authority to make the
final decision, but when the agency rejects the AL's decision, the
standard for judicial review will be de novo.140 The ALJ is
required to give deference to the agency's expertise so long as the
agency adequately demonstrates its expertise. 
4 1
Obviously, the North Carolina General Assembly engaged in a
thorough analysis of arguments on both sides of the debate. Not
once, however, did the assembly consider instituting AUA finality
with a denial of agency-initiated judicial review. Unlike North
Carolina's APA, Louisiana has given its Als "so much power
that they effectively oust agencies of their proper decisional
role"'142 because Louisiana agencies have no mechanism to fulfill
their delegated duty.
Additionally, the court's statement in Wooley that "AIls make
administrative law rulings that are not subject to enforcement and
do not have the force of law" is quite remarkable. 143 If this is true,
it is hard to believe that the Louisiana Legislature intended to have
an unenforceable system of AL finality. Where questions of law,
in particular, are decided with no opportunity for judicial review,
those decisions of law are final and have the effect of law because
no alternative exists to question those decisions. It was this very
137. Id. at 1577.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Miller, supra note 129, at 1661.
141. Id. Regarding how an agency might adequately demonstrate its
expertise, Senator Brad Miller, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary II Committee,
said,
[i]n the end, we decided not to decide. Again, the procedures by
which the AU decides how agency expertise can be demonstrated
should never be an issue on judicial review. When the decision of the
AL differs from the final agency decision, the question on judicial
review is not the procedural correctness of the decision below, but
rather a de novo review of the record.
Id. at 1662-63.
142. See Daye, supra note 30, at 1577.
143. See Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 04-0882 (La. 2005), 893
So. 2d 746.
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issue that prompted the vigorous debate in North Carolina, and
to their credit, the North Carolina APA serves as a model
compromise representing all sides.
V. PROPOSALS FOR A CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND LAPA
A. Allow Agencies the Right to Judicial Review
The first proposal for a constitutionally sound LAPA is to
keep the current DAL system, but simply allow agencies the
right to seek judicial review. This proposal is consistent with a
system of ALJ finality, but it is unnecessary in a system that
already allows the agency some say, whether initial or final, in
the decision making process. Louisiana's current denial of
judicial review coupled with ALJ finality completely cuts
agencies off from making law and policy. Instead, both law and
policy are currently made by the ALJs in the DAL with no
opportunity for agency review. This proposal provides
Louisiana's system of ALJ final order authority with the
necessary mechanism for agencies to fulfill their delegated
duties.
In a central panel with final order authority, such as
Louisiana's DAL, the agency is reduced from an adjudicator to
a mere interested party to the adjudication. Such a reduction is
appropriate given the strong policy arguments in favor of central
panels and ALJ finality. However, as in any other adjudication,
all parties to the litigation must be granted the right to seek
judicial review. A fair and constitutionally sound system
requires some give and take. If the ALJs are to have final order
authority, then for the agencies to be able to perform their
delegated duty of enforcing the regulations they promulgate,
agencies must be granted the right to seek judicial review of
adverse ALJ final orders. By allowing agencies the right to
judicial review, the judiciary's power is not infringed because
ALJ questions of law adverse to the agency may be appealed to
Article V courts. Also, the executive's power is not infringed
because the agencies are still allowed some mechanism to make
and enforce law and policy.
One important criticism of this proposal is that such a
system is invariably biased toward the atgncies which have the
unlimited financial backing of the state. In fact, the Judicial
Review amendment was enacted, in part, to remedy this
144. See Arnici Legislature and Director's Brief, supra note 50.
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concern. 145 If such a system were allowed, the argument is that
agencies could tie up regulated entities and individuals in court
until they lose the financial and emotional will to continue to
press their case. This is certainly a crucial concern; however, it
is not necessary to deny agency-initiated judicial review of final
AU orders in order to sufficiently meet it. This concern may be
adequately addressed by providing procedural safeguards
monitoring the standards of review to be used by the courts on
judicial review.
With this in mind, this proposal advocates differing
standards of review for questions of fact, questions of law, and
questions of policy. A strict form of deference should be
accorded to AU factual decisions, as the ALJ is the ultimate
trier of fact and has the advantage of viewing the witnesses'
demeanor during cross-examination. Thus, agencies should not
be able to easily or successfully contest ALT factual decisions,
unless the ALJ has committed manifest error. On the other
hand, less deference should be accorded to ALJ decisions of law
as the ALJ has no advantage over the court regarding such
decisions. As noted by Judge Dennis, "Article V courts must
review all questions of law decided by non-Article Vtribunals .''146
Finally, on issues of policy, political accountability must be
taken into account. Since the ALJs in the DAL are appointed by
the Director of the DAL, who is appointed by the Governor of
Louisiana,147 neither the ALJs themselves, nor the DAL as an
entity, is politically accountable to the citizens of Louisiana.
However, since the agency head of the Department of Insurance
is duly elected by the citizens of Louisiana, 48 the COI is
politically accountable for his or her policy decisions.
As urged by Professor Rossi, "the political accountability of
agency heads is important to ensuring the public legitimacy of
agency action.' 49  Therefore, when courts review issues of
policy decided by an ALJ, "the agency's reasoning framework
should trump the ALJ's reasoning, or that of any competing
145. See supra Part II.A.2.
146. See Dennis, supra note 96, at 93. The term "Non-Article V" tribunals
typically refers to administrative agencies. However, since adjudications in
Louisiana have been transferred to the central panel, the DAL, this term also
applies to Al~s in the DAL.
147. See La. R.S. 49:995 (2003).
148. La. Const. art. IV, § 3.
149. See Rossi, supra note 1, at 71.
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expert witness." Just as strong deference should be accorded
to AU findings of fact, strong deference also should be
accorded to the reasoning of politically accountable agencies on
issues of policy. The public has the power to hold agencies
politically accountable for their policy decisions. The same is
not true of politically insulated ALJs.
In practice, application of these principles is more daunting
than theory may suggest. More often than not, the usual
administrative adjudication handled by an ALJ involves mixed
questions of law, fact, and policy. Sometimes it is very difficult
to separate these three. In such a case, the court must engage in
a de novo review of the matter while balancing the AL's
advantage of viewing the witnesses' demeanor under cross-
examination with the agency's advantages of expertise and
political accountability. After all, "agencies are often immersed
in administering a particular statute. Such specialization gives
those agencies an intimate knowledge of the problems dealt with
in the statute and the various administrative consequences
arising from particular interpretations."
15 1
One major criticism of this proposal could be that such a
system is inefficient for administrative adjudications, as well as
for Article V courts. However, a little inefficiency is a small
price to pay to preserve our constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers. This proposal requires more work than the current
system, but it will be well worth it for Louisiana to have a
constitutionally sound, cutting edge APA to which other states,
and even the federal APA, might look for direction in amending
their APAs. Louisiana should no longer substitute efficiency for
fundamental constitutional principles.
B. Follow North Carolina's Lead in Striking an Appropriate
Balance
In case the legislature is wary of allowing agency-initiated
judicial review, the second proposal is to follow North
Carolina's lead in striking an appropriate balance between the
competing interests at stake. This proposal is consistent with
the traditional system where ALJs recommended decisions to
the agencies, which made the final decision. This proposal will
not work properly in a system of ALJ finality. Even though
150. Id.
151. Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of
California Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1157, 1196 (1995).
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North Carolina had the opportunity to institute ALJ finality in
its APA, the General Assembly chose another course. Agencies
retained the right to make the final decision on administrative
adjudications; however, if the agency overturned the ALJ's
decision, the agency's decision would be subject to de novo
review by the courts on judicial review.
This approach respects both sides of the debate in that
neither the agencies, nor the ALJs are completely excluded from
the process. An important advantage of this approach is that it
is familiar-the first part of this process is similar to the
traditional federal APA, which allows hearing officers or ALJs
to make a recommended decision prior to the agency's final
decision.152 At the same time, this approach utilizes the courts
to resolve disagreements between agencies and ALJs, which
properly protects the judiciary's check on the executive branch.
One undeniable criticism of this approach is that in
situations where the agency disagrees with the ALJ's decision,
the courts are merely substituting their judgment while
completely ignoring the ALJ's advantage of viewing the
witnesses' demeanor under cross-examination and the agencies'
advantages of expertise and political accountability. These
advantages are ignored because no deference is due in a de novo
review, which occurs when the agency disagrees with the ALJ in
North Carolina's APA.
Yet this criticism is easily overcome by applying the same
standards of review for issues of fact, law, and policy as
suggested in the first proposal. The ALJ's recommended
decision should be given strong deference on issues of fact
whereas less deference should be accorded to ALJ decisions of
law. Where there is an issue of law or of policy, the agency's
final decision should be given strong deference. Finally, in
cases where there are mixed issues, the court should review the
matter de novo, as provided in North Carolina's APA, while
being mindful of the respective advantages of both the ALJ and
the agency. Either proposal will render a sophisticated and
constitutionally sound APA for Louisiana.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Wooley, the Louisiana Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether an explicit denial of agency-initiated judicial review in
a system of ALJ finality comports with the constitutional
152. See supra Part I.A.
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doctrine of separation of powers. Even though the court
answered this issue in the affirmative, the correct finding would
conclude that such a denial is an unconstitutional infringement
on the judicial branch in that a crucial check on the executive is
obliterated, which leads to an impermissible divestiture of the
appellate jurisdiction of Article V courts and a deprivation of
the judiciary's inherent authority to decide questions of law.
This denial is also an unconstitutional infringement on the
executive branch in that the executive COI is stripped of his
core function of protecting the public interest.
It is quite remarkable that this debate was foreshadowed
merely one year prior to Louisiana's passage of the Judicial
Review amendment by two authors with their, self-described,
"not yet thoroughly baked idea."' 53 Judge McCowan and Ms.
Leo opined "why not give the agency the same right as other
parties in a contested case: the right of appeal of the decision to
court?"' 154 They wisely reasoned "now that agency authority is
limited, perhaps the agency should have a right to appeal."
55
This idea came about in response to a more limited APA system
that focused on balancing the needs of both the agencies and
ALJs, much like North Carolina's APA. 156 This argument in
favor of agency-initiated judicial review is only strengthened
when analyzing Louisiana's system, which completely cuts
agencies out of the decision and policy-making process.
Despite the outcome in Wooley, the legislature must revisit
this issue with more sensitivity to the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers. The best avenue for Louisiana lies in
retaining ALJ finality, allowing agency-initiated judicial review
of adverse ALJ decisions, and requiring the courts to apply
differing standards of review with respect to issues of fact, law,
and policy. If the legislature decides against retaining the
current system of ALJ finality, the best alternative is to strike an
appropriate balance between the agencies and the ALJs much
like North Carolina has done. Only then will Louisiana truly be
on the cutting edge of the modern administrative state, and ALJs
will no longer rule the world of administrative law in Louisiana.
Inherent constitutional principles must no longer be
surrendered for the sake of efficiency. As Chief Justice Burger
so eloquently stated when analyzing the separation of powers
between Congress and federal agencies, "the fact that a given
153. McCown & Leo, supra note 7, at 90.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 91.
156. Id.
law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in
facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not
save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and
efficiency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of
democratic government."'
57
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